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Casumo survey reveals the ultimate secret of being happy

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An ongoing Belgian legal case involving the PKK Beste Spielothek in Drigge finden the potential to exacerbate tensions between Brussels and Double down casino promo code, as do the applications for Belgian citizenship made by several members of the Turkish opposition who fled to Belgium following the coup attempt. The ECHR will ultimately take up the matter. It is more conservative, nationalist, and, at times, emotional. Turkey has little, if any, cultural influence in Lithuania. The list of examples is long. With the rise of the AKP, Turkey sought to improve its ties with the diaspora in many countries — most notably Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands england qualifikation em 2019 and to this end invested in consular services, communications, and grassroots organisations. Malta values Beste Spielothek in Marth finden relationship with Turkey — a major Mediterranean power with substantial maritime interests in Malta — almost exclusively for its economic benefits. 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It is more conservative, nationalist, and, at times, emotional. This would also boost a Turkish economy which is showing signs of vulnerability due to its huge current account deficit and problems with high inflation. Tony Bellew Tony Bellew vs Usyk: Turkey has become increasingly inward-looking and ever less democratic in the past few years, especially since the failed coup attempt in July Due to the presence of roughly 1. Turks and Europeans often talk past one another.

So, what can be preserved and achieved in the relationship? Should the sides keep the moribund accession process on the books or start discussing a new framework?

How will Turkey and the EU manage overwhelmingly negative public perceptions of each other while elites struggle to prolong the status quo?

But, at the same time, EU countries see Turkey as a major strategic ally, an important or potentially important trading partner, and a power that should be kept close.

Although EU member states and European decision-makers have little desire to revive the accession process, many view Turkey as a crucial partner.

Paradoxically, dysfunction and hypocrisy help maintain the accession process. This is because countries that might quietly have questions about full Turkish membership of the EU, such as Poland and Cyprus, can claim to support the process safe in the knowledge that it will remain stalled.

Meanwhile, Turkey can use the power of hypocrisy to build a model for cooperation with the EU, preserving the status quo in the accession process with the support of around 70 percent of EU decision-makers.

This is a considerable majority. Although Turkey has long focused on its disputes with the European Commission and EU politicians, the most dedicated pro-Turkey advocates remain EU elites — officials, diplomats, and decision-makers.

In wanting to keep Turkey close, EU member states have varying reasons but are primarily motivated by either fear or greed. Those that strongly advocate maintaining the accession process do so out of either a sense of vulnerability, a strategic need, or the belief that Turkey is economically important to Europe.

Despite the strong anti-Muslim sentiment in parts of Polish society, Poland fears a strong Germany and would like to have another big player on the scene — hence its support for the accession process continuing as it is.

Britain sees the possibility of a loose union in general — and favours enlarging the EU over deepening relations between its member states.

Some believe that there is a strategic case for Turkey joining the EU in the future — but not necessarily now.

Most European countries would like Turkey to remain in the limbo between being an insider and an outsider. Turkey has become increasingly inward-looking and ever less democratic in the past few years, especially since the failed coup attempt in July Despite this, EU-Turkey relations have remained intact.

The European Commission and the European Council have dismissed calls from the European Parliament to suspend the accession talks.

These trends suggest that if Turkey reverses its drift towards authoritarianism, it may have a chance to revive its accession bid. As a consequence, the accession process has lost all credibility.

Turkish bureaucrats who work on the EU accession process often emphasise the fact that this state of limbo is not what Ankara wants but this is what it gets.

The only movement in the accession process in recent years involved a brief opening in EU-Turkey relations with the migration deal the sides reached in December At the moment, the Turkish government shows no apparent desire to return to a governance system centred on the rule of law and displays little regard for the Copenhagen Criteria.

And the EU shows no indication of either reviving the accession process or pushing Turkey out. Here are more examples of hypocrisy.

European elites like the idea of Turkey, as opposed to the reality; and they like the notion of a strategic alliance with the country, but not necessarily as a member of the club.

Yet, in reality, the interrupted and dysfunctional process closely resembles the privileged partnership Turks have been rejecting all along due to its connotations of second-tier status.

A new language and a new framework are needed to reconcile these apparent contradictions. When the focus moves away from the accession process, it becomes relatively easy for EU member states and citizens to recognise that an effective partnership with Turkey is critical to their interests.

Turkish leaders in Ankara should understand that the only real advocates for the relationship are those that represent the establishment in Europe — that is, the collective of bureaucrats and politicians Turkish officials often fume at.

Leaders in Ankara should recognise this fact even as they launch verbal attacks on EU bureaucrats and politicians.

That figure accounts for 22 of 28 member states. Coming at the lowest point in EU-Turkey relations in recent times, these findings should hearten Ankara.

Of course, public opinion is a different matter. Public sentiment about Turkey sharply diverges from the views of the establishment. But the public remains unconvinced.

It is no coincidence that spikes in Turkish-European tension almost always coincide with elections in Europe or Turkey. European leaders show relatively little willingness to accommodate Ankara during an election, the time at which they are most under pressure to cater to public opinion.

In navigating this difficult territory, particularly the widening gap between elite views and public opinion, Turkish and EU leaders require an approach more nuanced than simple repetitions of support for the status quo.

There is reason to downplay accession on both sides. Instead of framing every advance or setback in the relationship as part of the accession process, the sides can work together as strategic partners and establish the tone the Turkish government has asked for all along.

Such a transactional relationship, with a focus on bilateral ties, is perhaps the only realistic way to maintain EU—Turkey ties for the moment.

Moving away from the accession focus would likely reduce tensions with the European Commission and help European leaders accommodate public opinion, while allowing for deeper bilateral engagement with Turkey on business deals, foreign policy, and counter-terrorism.

French officials argue that bilateral engagement also allows them to raise individual human rights issues with their Turkish interlocutors — albeit with mixed success.

When it comes to bilateral ties, most European nations seem happy to engage in some type of a give and take with Ankara, even though their citizens sometimes criticise this exchange.

For example, following the Brexit vote, Britain was eager to increase trade with Turkey and came to see Ankara as an essential partner in stabilising Syria and Iraq.

Similarly, the French value their partnership with Turkey on counter-terrorism. It is easier to make a case for bilateralism than for accession.

For Germany, the presence of a large Turkish diaspora creates a human bridge between the two nations that no politician can ignore. For Belgium, counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey is important in containing returning jihadists.

The list of examples is long. When tension around the accession process is set aside, engagement with Turkey appeals to all member states.

This is not to suggest that either side terminate the accession process. But since it is frozen and Ankara shows no real commitment to the Copenhagen Criteria for the moment , Europe and Turkey should shift their focus to maintaining a functional relationship.

Rather than be trapped by the existential question of whether to keep or terminate the accession process, European and Turkish leaders should direct their energy at cooperation in areas of mutual interest — at least for the next few years.

In this context, bilateral relations with member states — with an emphasis on foreign policy, counter-terrorism, and economic partnership — should form the new framework for cooperation.

Such a shift may already be happening. Equally, although Macron raised various human rights issues during talks with the Turkish leader, his main goal seemed to be maintaining open channels of communication with a powerful regional partner rather than to push Turkey towards accession.

During the last two years, public exchanges between Turkish and European leaders have often descended into vitriol and resentment. This verbal war of attrition must stop.

Fortunately, there are signs that it will: Of course, Turkey and Europe will continue to criticise each other, but unless this criticism remains within the scope of civilised debate, there will be a further decline in public support for their relationship.

In the run-up to the April referendum, attacks on the EU became common in Turkish public discourse as the governing AKP worked to secure the nationalist vote.

These tactics both poisoned EU-Turkey relations and alienated the sizeable portion of Turkish society that still harbours pro-European sentiment.

Turkey has its own concerns too. There is an increasing tendency within the Turkish bureaucracy and the AKP elite to see media outlets and civil society groups, including human rights organisations, as the secret arm of Western governments.

Ankara is drifting towards a Russian-style divergence from the EU in the debate on values, seeing the promotion of human rights, free speech, and vibrant civil society as an effort to undercut its sovereignty.

Doing otherwise would produce a considerable backlash from the government of Turkey. As hard to accept as it may be, the gap in values is a reality for the moment.

But Turks and Europeans can still find common ground, especially in transactional arrangements. In turn, Turkish leaders have curbed comments that are deeply offensive to Germans.

It is more conservative, nationalist, and, at times, emotional. Turks and Europeans often talk past one another. This incarnation of the country is deeply nationalistic and conservative, as well as strongly suspicious of Western designs on it.

In private, most Turkish officials express the belief that the US was behind the coup attempt and that the EU wanted the plotters to succeed.

Along the way, they failed to detect the deep sense of insecurity about the future in Ankara and wider Turkish society.

Many members of the EU elite do not grasp the fact that Turkish society perceives the coup attempt as an existential threat. Such misunderstanding almost certainly runs even deeper among EU citizens generally.

This is something more than a case of miscommunication. One of the reasons Ankara and Moscow have become closer over the last few years is their shared perception that the West is trying to undermine their regimes using human rights concerns and civil society groups.

Although Turkish officials profess a commitment to democracy in general, in practice there seems to be a huge divergence between Turkey and the EU on the question of values.

Moreover, the highly paranoid, security-focused climate in Turkey likely prevents the country from returning to the EU reform process.

There are lessons here for both sides. Turks should recognise that human rights violations have pushed European concerns about the coup attempt into the background — that the international community has failed to adequately sympathise with Turkey over the incident due to the severity of the resulting crackdown.

The EU should recognise that much of Turkish society including many Turks who dislike the AKP opposed the coup attempt and blames the Gülen network for it.

Europe should tread lightly on the topic of the coup, and with empathy. Statements that are dismissive of the coup attempt or its alleged perpetrators exacerbate Turkish suspicion that the West would have preferred a different outcome.

Relations with the EU are important but no longer a priority for Ankara. The stagnation in the EU accession negotiations is perfectly acceptable to the Turkish government — if not to the Turkish bureaucrats and diplomats who have toiled for decades to advance the process.

For him, it is far more important to sustain his alliance with the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party MHP than to embark upon reforms that could revive the accession process.

In the run-up to the presidential election, Turkey will continue to be inward-looking and polarised — making the suspension of accession talks or the continuation of the status quo equally irrelevant to the public debate.

Meanwhile, Turkey is no longer a priority for Europe either. Reforming European institutions, the fallout from Brexit, and the surge of anti-European parties across the continent seem far more significant than the question of what to do about accession talks with Turkey.

With the exception of those in Germany where Turkey is part of the domestic debate due to its large Turkish diaspora community , European elections throughout and largely focused on the existential threat to pan-European ideals.

In this atmosphere of urgency, Turkey was, at best, a sideshow. However, there has been no apparent effort to create the road map for improving Turkish-EU relations reportedly discussed at the summit.

To help stabilise the relationship, Ankara and the Council of Europe should work together to address difficult issues such as human rights, the rule of law, and political freedoms in Turkey.

They should do so outside the accession process, but in a way that helps Turkey meet the Copenhagen Criteria.

Turkish citizens have long held the institution in high esteem, while its verdicts are binding for Ankara as a member of the Council of Europe.

The court has been careful and judicious in its approach to human rights cases and settlement demands since the coup attempt of , despite criticism from Turkish human rights advocates over its long deliberations.

Moreover, it has shown reluctance to take up cases before internal judicial proceedings have been exhausted.

At the request of Council of Europe and ECHR, the Turkish government has established an independent body to evaluate complaints from nearly , purged government employees since the coup — though with mixed results.

The ECHR will ultimately take up the matter. This is a delicate issue that Europeans need to handle carefully. The Turkish president does not want to see a challenge to his rule in the run-up to the election.

At a time when there is talk of Russia leaving the ECHR, Europeans are reluctant to push Ankara too far about its outstanding human rights cases before the court.

But the survey also reveals an awareness that this is untapped potential. In light of this, in Turkish and European policymakers proposed an initiative to upgrade the customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU.

The same year, the European Parliament mandated the European Commission to explore the matter, while various Turkish institutions and think-tanks began to analyse the modernisation of the existing customs union deal as a means to deepen relations in a time of crisis.

However, following the bitter spat between Ankara and Berlin in summer , the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, withdrew support for the idea, effectively shelving the proposal.

Gabriel had already declared a new, harsher policy on Turkey: Time and again, we have trusted that reason will prevail again and that we will find our way back to thriving relations.

Time and again, we have been disappointed. But the cold war between Turkey and Germany was short-lived. The veiled threat of economic sanctions brought about a thaw in Turkish-German relations.

The Turkish government ended its criticism of European leaders — the Nazi comments and allegations of European support for terrorism — and opened direct channels of communication with Berlin, Paris, and several other capitals.

This was not about drawing closer to the accession process but about fixing bilateral ties with major European powers to maintain Turkish economic growth, especially at a time when Turkey was having difficulty attracting investment and its economy was starting to show signs of vulnerability.

Today, Ankara regards a customs union upgrade as a way to shore up the economy. The Turkish and EU economies are deeply integrated, with the bulk of Turkish exports going to Europe.

By modernising its customs union with Turkey, the EU could increase that interdependency in a way that could moderate their political disputes.

This would also boost a Turkish economy which is showing signs of vulnerability due to its huge current account deficit and problems with high inflation.

The process of negotiating a customs union would give the EU some leverage on issues such as labour laws, human rights, and dispute settlement.

It would be an exaggeration to say that modernising the customs union would indirectly cause Turkey to return to a governance model based on the rule of law.

But doing so would introduce a new dynamism to the relationship and allow more Turkish-European interaction to discuss the rule of law, as well as labour and human rights issues, in Turkey.

Despite the ups and downs of the accession process, that economic anchor to Turkish society ought to be preserved through deeper economic integration.

Having lost lucrative trade with Middle East economies and suffering from an investment deficit due, in part, to the state of emergency and domestic instability, Ankara is eager to update the customs union with the EU.

For Turkey, while the dormant state of accession talks is acceptable, losing trade with the EU is not. Most EU officials admit that if Germany were willing to give a green light on modernisation negotiations, the European Commission would be able to move forward.

But timing is important here. Yet this is a bad time to deprive Turkish society of much-needed external support. Instead of slashing accession funds, European leaders should redirect these resources towards Turkish civil society, media, academia, municipalities, minorities, and non-governmental organisations that promote democracy, pluralism, and free speech.

EU officials explain this imbalance by complaining that Turkish civil society organisations do not have enough capacity to absorb more funding.

But this is hardly true. This is precisely where EU institutions can do most to support Turkish society — particularly pockets of society that lack capacity and are unaffected by the accession process, including Kurdish initiatives, non-Muslim minority schools, Syrian refugees, academic and arts organisations, and municipal initiatives across the Anatolian heartland.

These do not have to be political initiatives, as Ankara might view such collaboration as interference in its domestic politics.

But since Turkey is already receiving substantial funding, and since it is still in accession negotiations, the imbalance between official and unofficial projects needs to be addressed.

The EU should also consider starting a separate programme to provide resources for struggling independent media outlets in Turkey.

The EU could also consider establishing educational programmes and even a university in the country. Another important reason for Europe to establish a special relationship with Turkey while the accession process remains dormant relates to the Turkish diaspora in many leading EU countries.

Once viewed as the glue between Turkey and Europe, the diaspora and its politics have become a source of tension over the past two years as Ankara has continued to drift away from European norms and values.

This heterogenous diaspora includes people of different ethnicities, religions, hometowns, and political leanings — all factors that contribute to how they define their roles and identities in Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and elsewhere, as well as how they relate to the government of Turkey itself.

With the rise of the AKP, Turkey sought to improve its ties with the diaspora in many countries — most notably Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands — and to this end invested in consular services, communications, and grassroots organisations.

The AKP government established a key role for Diyanet in Sunni communities that form part of the diaspora. This began to create problems as Turkey drifted away from the EU accession process and the AKP started relying on overseas ballots to tip the scale in national elections.

The AKP government also started to rely on dual citizens from conservative segments of the diaspora for votes at home and to rally support in Europe.

The crisis came to a head in April , when Germany and the Netherlands forbade the Turkish president from campaigning for the referendum on the executive presidency in their territory.

The Danish ministry of foreign affairs summoned the Turkish ambassador to discuss the issue twice in In February , Germany accused six Turkish imams of espionage, alleging that they were gathering information on suspected Gülenists in the German-Turkish community.

Due to the presence of roughly 1. But it is possible to limit tensions around election time. Can Turkish ministers hold campaign rallies in German cities?

Can the opposition raise funds there? Similarly, are Kurds allowed to hold rallies in support of the PKK or Syrian Kurdish groups — both of which Turkey considers to be terrorists?

What is the role of the local government and the federal authorities in obtaining these permits? In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has largely focused on the Middle East, particularly Syria and Iraq.

Although it has long abandoned its dreams of leading the region in a new Pax Ottomanica , Ankara remains preoccupied with events in its neighbourhood.

Despite these preoccupations, Turks and Europeans do not work together on foreign policy issues. Even though migration is one of the main concerns for Brussels and politicians across Europe, there is a remarkable lack of European interest and involvement in Middle East conflicts, particularly those in Iraq and Syria.

Turkey and the EU have broadly similar goals on the stabilisation of Syria and Iraq, but the sides rarely work on these issues together. It is important for European institutions and policymakers to develop a closer working relationship with Turkey on the stabilisation of the region.

But, while European and Turkish intelligence officials often engage in bilateral cooperation, work to stabilise the Middle East between their counterparts in defence and foreign ministries is more limited.

There is a simple bureaucratic reason for this: But Turkey is both a European and Middle Eastern country. European governments could work more closely and effectively with Ankara on Middle East issues by developing a better understanding of their shared interests in the region, particularly in the stabilisation and reconstruction of war-torn regions of Syria and Iraq, and in curbing jihadist influence in these countries.

Turkey has an interest in stabilising countries on its southern border and has emerged as a key participant in the Russian-led Astana process on the Syrian conflict.

Ankara is also interested in bolstering its role as a leader of Sunni Muslims in the region. The sides also have a common interest in containing jihadists in the Middle East.

To address these concerns, the EU needs to develop a working relationship with the Turkish government on the stabilisation and reconstruction of northern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the disputed territories of Iraq, including the oil-rich town of Kirkuk.

Looking for something to read, she opened a book and found a Father's Day card that revealed her husband's secret double life.

She said that her husband Eddie worked away a lot and would be home for six days then gone for eight. The arrangement was a challenge with two young daughters to raise - but Belinda never suspected her husband was up to no good.

One day she searched through the bookshelves and didn't find anything she fancied reading, so looked in Eddie's bedside table.

Inside a Father's Day card in a child's handwriting it read: Belinda hoped it was a book borrowed from a friend, but said "my gut told me I needed to investigate".

Belinda assumed that he must be hiding a lovechild from her but it turned out to be a far worse situation, she added: It turned out Eddie had been with a woman called Natasha for 10 years and was juggling the two partners in different cities.

Belinda's cheating husband then decided he needed to make a go of things with his partner, promised their daughters would be looked after and left - leaving her "devastated".

The brave mum said she managed to "make the best of the situation" and the pair are civil. She concluded by saying she contacted his partner Natasha on Facebook and sent her a snap of her husband's secret family "so she understood what sort of man she is living with".

By Robyn Darbyshire Audience Writer. The card revealed a secret she never knew Image: Thank you for subscribing We have more newsletters Show me See our privacy notice.

Subscribe to our Daily news newsletter Enter email Subscribe. More On Cheating Father's Day. Lifestyle all Most Read Most Recent Parenting 'Huge red flag' in photo of boy reveals surprise cause of his naughty behaviour Kian's behavioural issues, at first thought to be ADHD, were solved when the cause was identified - and his mum is trying to help other parents.

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In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has largely focused on the Middle East, particularly Syria and Iraq. Although it has long abandoned its dreams of leading the region in a new Pax Ottomanica , Ankara remains preoccupied with events in its neighbourhood.

Despite these preoccupations, Turks and Europeans do not work together on foreign policy issues.

Even though migration is one of the main concerns for Brussels and politicians across Europe, there is a remarkable lack of European interest and involvement in Middle East conflicts, particularly those in Iraq and Syria.

Turkey and the EU have broadly similar goals on the stabilisation of Syria and Iraq, but the sides rarely work on these issues together.

It is important for European institutions and policymakers to develop a closer working relationship with Turkey on the stabilisation of the region.

But, while European and Turkish intelligence officials often engage in bilateral cooperation, work to stabilise the Middle East between their counterparts in defence and foreign ministries is more limited.

There is a simple bureaucratic reason for this: But Turkey is both a European and Middle Eastern country.

European governments could work more closely and effectively with Ankara on Middle East issues by developing a better understanding of their shared interests in the region, particularly in the stabilisation and reconstruction of war-torn regions of Syria and Iraq, and in curbing jihadist influence in these countries.

Turkey has an interest in stabilising countries on its southern border and has emerged as a key participant in the Russian-led Astana process on the Syrian conflict.

Ankara is also interested in bolstering its role as a leader of Sunni Muslims in the region. The sides also have a common interest in containing jihadists in the Middle East.

To address these concerns, the EU needs to develop a working relationship with the Turkish government on the stabilisation and reconstruction of northern Syria, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the disputed territories of Iraq, including the oil-rich town of Kirkuk.

Such cooperation is also important in developing representative governance structures in Sunni Arab towns in northern Syria and Iraq that the Islamic State group once occupied — such as those between the Syrian towns of Jarablus and Azaz, which Turkish forces gained control of during Operation Euphrates Shield.

But it does mean developing a more comprehensive approach to Turkey, especially within EU and member state institutions that cover Middle East issues, bilateral ties with Turkey, and the accession process.

It is not all over for Turkey and Europe, despite the trench warfare that took place during and between Ankara and various European capitals.

This leaves only one option for the EU and Turkey: Modernising the existing customs union with the EU, deepening counter-terrorism and energy ties, developing human rights dialogue through the Council of Europe, and stabilising the Middle East are a few obvious areas of cooperation.

Economic cooperation through transactional bilateral arrangements is another. The EU can still maintain ties to Ankara and Turkish civil society through existing enlargement channels.

In , around 85 percent of this community perceived a rise in Islamophobia in Austria, while around 43 percent wanted to leave the country.

No high-ranking Austrian politicians have officially visited Ankara since Taking its lead from Germany and the Netherlands, Austria forbade entry to the Turkish economy minister while he was campaigning for the April Turkish constitutional referendum.

Austrian leaders have stated privately and publicly that he is transforming Turkey into an authoritarian country that has little respect for European values.

Belgium regards its relationship with Turkey as a pragmatic partnership. The Belgian public has also developed an increasingly negative view of Turkey since , when 68 percent of Belgians opposed Turkish accession to the EU.

Formalised by the trilateral platform, the Turkey-Belgium relationship focuses on terrorism, asylum, and migration issues. Belgian officials view Turkey as key in monitoring the movements of foreign fighters who have joined terrorist groups in the Middle East.

An ongoing Belgian legal case involving the PKK has the potential to exacerbate tensions between Brussels and Ankara, as do the applications for Belgian citizenship made by several members of the Turkish opposition who fled to Belgium following the coup attempt.

Bulgaria has relatively good ties with Turkey, but underneath their neighbourly relations lies an understanding that a Turkey within the EU accession process is less of a threat than one with regional ambitions and resurgent Turkish nationalism.

There is a live debate in Bulgaria about the Ottoman legacy and the extent to which AKP policies are mimicking this. Still, Bulgaria consistently regards Turkey as a key neighbour and a strategically important NATO ally, as well as one of its five most important trade partners, a major investor, and a leading destination for Bulgarian tourists.

Sofia is reluctant to jeopardise its relationship with Ankara because it values Turkish cooperation in controlling the flow of refugees and other migrants into Europe.

They perceived Turkey as having directly interfered in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands and Germany, primarily through the Turkish diaspora.

Regarding itself as a friend of Ankara, Zagreb has traditionally expressed strong support for Turkish accession to the European Union.

Yet, since the July coup attempt in Turkey, Croatia seems to have to kept to the margins of the accession negotiations. Moreover, Croatia supports all EU endeavours designed to promote security cooperation with Turkey, not least those involving the war in Syria.

In this, the countries have shared intelligence related to money-laundering and terrorist financing. Zagreb regards Croatia-Turkey economic ties as relatively unimportant.

Cyprus is the only member of the European Union that Turkey does not recognise diplomatically. The Cypriot government officially regards Turkey as an occupying foreign power, as the country maintains a deployment of around 40, soldiers in northern Cyprus, protecting a de facto state that only Turkey recognises diplomatically.

In July , talks on reunifying the island failed after the Greek-Cypriot side rejected a Turkish-Cypriot proposal to grant Turkey and two other guarantor states the right to intervene in Cyprus.

The Greek-Cypriot public perceives Turkey as an aggressive nation. Cyprus believes that the sides will have the opportunity to cooperate with Turkey, particularly on trade and transport, once they have restored their diplomatic relationship.

Cyprus continues to insist that Turkey recognise all EU member states in line with a EU declaration, to no avail. Given this tension, it is possible that Cyprus would impede any negotiations on upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union.

There was a drastic decrease in the number of Cypriot tourists visiting Turkey in , likely due to a series of terrorist attacks and the failed coup there.

The Czech Republic regards Turkey as a partner, albeit a difficult one. In recent years, there has been a substantial decline in support for Turkey among Czech citizens, partly due to growing Islamophobia.

The Czech-Turkish bilateral agenda centres on, inter alia, pressure from the Turkish government to extradite, or otherwise limit the activities of, supporters of US-based cleric Fethullah Gülen.

This pressure has created economic losses for the Czech Republic. Danish policy on Turkey has changed significantly in recent years, particularly since the July failed coup attempt in the country.

Media coverage of Turkey has risen sharply in Denmark since the finalisation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal in Danes generally agree that there is a lack of evidence Gülen was involved in the coup attempt.

In its dealings with Turkey, Denmark has increasingly moved away from values-based politics and towards transactional diplomacy, with trade and immigration the focal points of the relationship.

Partly due to its high-profile anti-immigration policy, the Danish government benefits from the EU-Turkey refugee deal, a popular topic in Danish public discourse.

Attempting to balance pragmatism with pessimism, Estonians regard Turkey as a reliable, albeit remote, ally. Partly because its elite focuses on stability, Estonia pursues bilateral relations with Turkey that centre on political, security, and economic cooperation, as well as on efforts to strengthen business and diplomatic ties.

In , 45 percent of Estonians opposed European Union enlargement. Estonia has held to its official position of supporting Turkish accession to the EU, downplaying human rights violations and the erosion of democratic practices in Turkey.

In recent decades, successive Finnish governments have held a positive view of Turkey, regarding the country as a partner and a friend.

Although Finland recognises that the likelihood of Turkish accession has been declining for some time, it prefers to address human rights and democracy issues involving Turkey using private channels.

In a December press release, members of the latter demanded the temporary suspension of negotiations on Turkish accession to the EU.

Finnish citizens are predominantly sceptical of EU enlargement generally and the prospect of Turkish membership specifically. This is because there are only limited ties between Turkey and Finland, due to their geographical separation and modest trading relationship, as well as the fact that the Turkish diaspora in Finland is relatively small.

While there is only limited trade between France and Turkey, Paris regards Ankara as a strategically indispensable partner in counter-terrorism campaigns, efforts to address the refugee crisis, and foreign policy in the Levant.

Eager to avoid the kind of decline in its relationship with Turkey that Germany has experienced in recent years, France has generally avoided public condemnation of Turkish leaders.

Turkey has only limited influence on French culture and domestic politics. Although some Turkish non-governmental, linguistic, and research organisations have attempted to raise the profile of Turkish affairs in France, their effect on the French public remains insignificant as their activities target only a small audience.

Germany-Turkey relations are wide-ranging, intense, and complex. The nearly three million Turks living in Germany lend Ankara significant influence on German domestic politics.

According to a poll conducted in July , around 80 percent of Germans believe that Turkey is not a democracy. Another, conducted the following September, found that 84 percent of them opposed Turkish membership of the European Union.

As part of its new approach, Germany has rejected requests to expand the Turkey-EU customs union. Government representatives stress that no improvement in relations is possible while the Turkish government imprisons German citizens.

Yet these political tensions have had little effect on Germany-Turkey economic ties. Moreover, the sides have sustained security cooperation in NATO, the fight against terrorism, and efforts to stabilise the Middle East, particularly Syria.

There is a consensus in Berlin that Germany should not cut ties with Turkey completely. Greece is deeply ambivalent about Turkey, which it views as both an important economic partner and a potential threat.

The countries have long disagreed about jurisdiction over the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the militarisation of some Aegean islands, and frozen conflict in Cyprus.

Yet they have often cooperated effectively on tourism, trade, and other economic issues, with Turkish companies even participating in the privatisation of Greek firms.

Beyond their bilateral relationship, Greece and Turkey disagree on major foreign policy issues such as the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Syrian war, the Trump administration, the Paris climate accords, and the conflict in Israel-Palestine.

Yet Greece demands that Turkey not only fulfil the accession criteria set by the European Council but also respect international law in the Cyprus conflict.

Largely oblivious to the significance of Greek-Turkish economic ties, Greeks generally hold negative views of Turkey. Yet there appears to be a consensus among Hungarian political parties to avoid criticising the state of democracy and human rights in Turkey.

Budapest has repeatedly urged other EU member states to respect the will of the democratically elected Turkish government.

Hungary regards Turkey as strategically important for economic and security reasons. In , the countries established the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council, while Ankara introduced short-term visa-free travel for Hungarian tourists and businesspeople.

Convinced that the EU should establish independent control of its external borders, the Hungarian government focuses its bilateral relationship with Ankara on migration, as well as the fight against terrorism.

Turkey has little cultural influence on Hungarian society, partly because there is only a small Turkish diaspora in Hungary.

Nonetheless, Turkish television series remain popular in Hungary. Irish citizens no longer regard Turkey as an increasingly attractive tourist destination but one characterised by instability and potential danger.

It unclear whether they support Turkish membership of the European Union. There has also been a noticeable shift in the perceptions of Irish politicians, who since have become more subdued in their support for Turkish membership.

This is partly because they believe that Ankara has, at times, responded to the coup attempt with disproportionate force.

Economic ties between Ireland and Turkey are relatively limited. Italy regards Turkey as a partner with a shared Mediterranean identity, believing that a stable relationship between the countries will protect Italian economic and geopolitical interests in the region.

Rome and Ankara have long had a healthy diplomatic and economic relationship, with Italy actively supporting Turkish accession to the European Union.

Rome fears that interrupting this process could destabilise the Mediterranean region and the Balkans, threatening EU economies and the EU-Turkey refugee deal.

Even if the accession process remains frozen for some time, the Italian government wishes to preserve it while continuing to engage with Ankara on their shared strategic interests.

In contrast, 78 percent of the Italian public oppose Turkish accession. Alongside economic and defence cooperation, Italy and Turkey also collaborate on issues such as the conflicts in Libya and Syria, the fight against the Islamic State group, and migration.

Latvian government has a generally positive view of Turkey, believing that it should be allowed to join the European Union if it meets the accession criteria.

By keeping the possibility of Turkish EU membership alive, Latvia hopes to prevent Turkey from strengthening its relationship with Russia perhaps through membership of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Perceiving Russia as the principal threat to its security, Lithuania holds a favourable view of Turkey as a possible counterweight to Russian influence.

Vilnius recognises that Ankara operates within the framework of NATO to ensure transatlantic security and address international threats such as terrorism.

There is no indication that this limited relationship will significantly change. Lithuania hopes to improve its economic cooperation with Turkey, aiming to become a logistics hub for Turkish goods exports to northern Europe.

Turkey has little, if any, cultural influence in Lithuania. Luxembour regards Turkey as a strategically important partner in addressing migration issues.

It views the refugee crisis as a challenge that the European Union can only address by cooperating with Ankara and other partners in the Mediterranean region.

Luxembourgish citizens are equally critical of recent developments in Turkey, perceiving them as part of a drift towards authoritarianism.

The Maltese government and public generally have a positive view of Turkey, a perception that likely contributes to the ongoing rise in people-to-people exchanges between Malta and Turkey.

Malta values its relationship with Turkey — a major Mediterranean power with substantial maritime interests in Malta — almost exclusively for its economic benefits.

Despite a slight decline in Malta-Turkey trade during the past five years, relations between the sides appear to have improved in the period.

The Maltese government has expressed conditional support for Turkish accession to the EU, gradual liberalisation of the visa regime for Turks in the EU, and an overhaul of the EU-Turkey customs union.

Yet the Maltese public generally has little interest in the issue of Turkish accession. The Netherlands regards its significant Turkish diaspora, comprising around 2.

Indeed, the countries have continued to work together on the European Union-Turkey refugee deal co-initiated by the Dutch government , economic affairs, and military cooperation through NATO an important consideration for both parties.

They have also sustained their collaborative counter-terrorism efforts through the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

Nonetheless, the Netherlands has recently increased its emphasis on the importance of the rule of law in Turkey, stating that improvements in this area are a prerequisite for expanding the EU-Turkey customs union.

In recent years, the Dutch public has adopted a progressively negative view of Turkey, becoming ever more opposed to Turkish membership of the EU. Poland's perception of Turkey is complex and often contradictory.

Yet the Polish elite also criticises Turkey as a country ruled by Islamists who closely cooperate with Russia. Poland sees Turkey as providing an avenue through which to diversify its trade relations beyond the European Union.

However, Poland has so far been unable to significantly increase its exports to Turkey. There has been an increasing number of xenophobic attacks against Turkish students in Poland in recent years.

Portugal has a generally neutral attitude towards Turkey. The countries have only recently begun to strengthen their bilateral relationship and to see each other as potential partners.

In this, Portugal aims to benefit from Turkish economic ties, while Turkey seeks Portuguese support in its bid for membership of the European Union.

The Portuguese government sees Turkish cooperation as vital to stabilising the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, particularly Syria and Iraq.

Although Lisbon relies on intelligence cooperation with Ankara in counter-terrorism and other areas, it views Turkey as having only a minor role in its foreign policy.

The Portuguese government believes that Turkey should be allowed to accede to the EU only if it fully complies with the Copenhagen Criteria.

Romania views Turkey as a partner due to their shared culture, history, and strategic aims. Viewing itself as a mediator between the rest of the European Union and Turkey, Romania calls for a constructive, pragmatic approach to Turkish issues.

It remains unclear how Romanians view him due to a lack of polling data , but there was widespread outrage in Romania when Turkey reneged on an agreement to build an Orthodox church in Istanbul in exchange for a mosque in Bucharest.

In Romania signed a strategic partnership agreement with Turkey, its most important non-EU economic partner. The deal, which is designed to improve their bilateral cooperation, continues to provide a framework for regular trade meetings between Romanian and Turkish officials.

Bucharest is particularly interested in working closely with Turkey in economic and security matters, not least efforts to stabilise the Black Sea region.

Bucharest continues to fully support negotiations on Turkish accession to EU based on established membership criteria.

Slovakia views Turkey as a strategically important partner with which it should maintain good political and economic relations. Bratislava particularly values this partnership for facilitating the refugee deal between the European Union and Turkey, which reduced the flow of refugees and other migrants into central European states by blocking the western Balkans route.

Slovakia officially supports Turkish membership of the European Union. Turkey has no shared historical heritage or cultural affinity with Slovakia.

As bilateral ties between the countries are relatively weak and there is only a small Turkish community in Slovakia, Ankara has little influence on Slovakian domestic politics.

Turkey and Slovenia formed a strategic partnership in , providing an institutional structure for their traditionally warm relationship.

The escalation of the refugee crisis in drew Slovenia deeper into the debate on Turkish accession, as Ljubljana views Ankara as promoting stability and security in the western Balkans and the Middle East.

The Slovenian public broadly favours Turkish accession to the EU. Although recent crises and tensions between Ankara and EU states have reduced this support, the issue has little impact on Slovenian domestic politics.

With only a small Turkish diaspora in Slovenia, Ankara has limited cultural influence in the country. While Berlin and Paris have in recent years grown more wary of Turkey, Madrid continues to view the country as a partner.

Nonetheless, since the Gezi Park protests, the Spanish authorities have downplayed their relationship with Turkey, partly by slowing the pace of official visits to the country.

Spain-Turkey relations centre on trade, joint political proposals — such as the Alliance of Civilizations — and, more recently, security and migration.

Facing political risks in Turkey, Spanish companies are no longer talking about opportunities there but rather efforts to conserve earlier gains.

Madrid regards Ankara as an important partner in the fight against jihadism, especially in detecting foreign fighters who are returning to Spain from jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq.

The Spanish government continues to officially support Turkish accession to the European Union, in line with the broader EU consensus.

Partly due to the lack of a sizeable Turkish diaspora in Spain, Spanish politicians are generally disinterested in Turkey.

There is little Islamophobia in Spain relative to other western European countries. Around half of the Spanish population oppose the EU-Turkey refugee deal, while slightly more than one-third support it.

Nonetheless, Turkey remains a minor issue in Spanish public discourse. As such, some observers have criticised the Swedish government for failing to pressure Ankara on the arbitrary detention of Swedish-Turkish citizens.

Domestic support for the Swedish Democrats — a xenophobic party that openly opposes Turkish membership of the EU — surged in the wake of the refugee crisis but has since declined.

Nonetheless, Swedish companies express a relatively positive attitude towards operating in Turkey. Sweden takes a pragmatic approach to its relationship with Turkey, focusing on immigration, security, and, to a lesser extent, the EU-Turkey refugee deal.

Sweden is one of the leading recipients of refugees in Europe and — through statements by the prime minister, Stefan Löfven — has expressed doubt about the safety of refugees in Turkey.

Yet Turkey remains a popular tourist destination for Swedes, who generally have positive views of Turkish culture. The United Kingdom has long regarded Turkey as a partner, albeit one that has little, if any, influence on British society.

The UK is striving to improve its defence and trade cooperation with Turkey while viewing the EU as a more important partner. Thank you for subscribing We have more newsletters Show me See our privacy notice.

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